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. INTRODUCTION
In the field of international investment law, foreign investors are commonly granted a
right to initiate international arbitration in the case of a dispute with host state author-
ities. As a consequence, foreign investors can often choose where to lodge a complaint
concerning host state action: either in the domestic courts of the host state or before an
international arbitral tribunal.1 When the investor chooses to pursue claims at the
international level, an arbitral ad hoc tribunal will evaluate the lawfulness of the host
state’s conduct against treaty standards, such as the fair and equitable treatment stan-
dard and the prohibition of expropriation without compensation. It has been noted
that, in such circumstances, the tribunal is called upon to fulfil a task similar to that
of the administrative or constitutional courts of the host state.2
Inmanymunicipal legal systems, the judicial review of government conduct is subject
to considerations of deference. They are based on the idea that judges do not possess
the expertise nor the democratic authorisation to substitute their judgment for that of
other governmental authorities. A topical question in the field of international invest-
ment law is whether investor-state arbitral tribunals should exercise similar restraint
* Many thanks to BaşakBağlayanCeyhan andRelja Radović for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of
this chapter.Manythanksalso toAlexanderPanayotov fornumerousconstructivediscussionson the topic.
1. The investor’s freedom of choice is of course limited by the applicable treaty provisions on waiting
periods and fork-in-the-road provisions. See Anne van Aken, ‘Primary and Secondary Remedies in
International Investment Law andNational State Liability. A Functional and Comparative View’ in Ste-
phan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 739-743. More-
over, the extent to which investors are required to make some effort to obtain local remedies remains
controversial. See e.g. George K Foster, ‘Striking a Balance between Investor Protections and National
Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011) 49 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 2, 201-267; Ursala Kriebaum, ‘Local Remedies and the Standards for the Pro-
tection of Foreign Investment’ in Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum,August Reinisch and StephanWit-
tich (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP
2009) 417-462.
2. Stephan W Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law. An Introduction’ in
Schill 2010, supra note 1, 4; Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 71.
when evaluating the conduct of states. Respondent states have often advocated such
an approach, arguing that arbitral tribunals should adopt a non-intrusive standard of
review when evaluating government conduct against treaty standards.3
Academic calls for deference in investor-state arbitration have been raised in response
to growing criticism of the current system.4 The core of this criticism is that investor-
state arbitration subjects government conduct to review by private arbitrators who
operate within in a system that favours investor interests over competing public inter-
ests. According to a ‘Statement of Concern’ drafted by a group of scholars in response
to the public consultation on the proposed inclusion of investor-state arbitration in the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), investment arbitration
‘involves a shift in sovereign priorities toward the interests of foreign owners of major
assets and away from those of other actors whose direct representation and partici-
pation is limited to democratic processes and judicial institutions’.5 It has been argued
that this type of concern could be resolved by recourse to deferential standards of
review. William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden propose that ‘the develop-
ment of new standards of review grounded in comparative public law’ can imbue
investment treaty arbitration ‘with enhanced legitimacy and result in procedures
and outcomes broadly acceptable to all stakeholders’.6 This proposition is not uncon-
tested, however, as various authors have argued that deference is inconsistent with
the very purpose of investor-state arbitration.7
3. E.g. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States [2009] UNCITRAL, Award <www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf> accessed 29 June 2015 [594-595].
4. William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: the Stan-
dards of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 2, 283-346;Wil-
liam Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‘The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in Investor-
State Arbitrations’ in Schill 2010, supra note 1, 689-720. See also ErlendM Leonhardsen, ‘Treaty Change,
Arbitral Practice and the Search for a Balance. Standards of Review and the Margin of Appreciation in
International Investment Law’ in Lukasz Gruszczynski and Wouter Werner (eds), Deference in Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals. Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation (OUP 2014) 135-151; Joshua
Paine, ‘The Project of System-Internal Reform in International Investment Law: An Appraisal’ (2015)
6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 2, 345: ‘A common diagnosis is that employment of inappro-
priately strict standards of review has resulted in one fundamental aspect of investment law’s legiti-
macy crisis, namely the impression that tribunals illegitimately intrude into public policy
determinations which are properly the responsibility of host state organs’.
5. Peter Muchlinski, Horatia Muir Watt, Gus van Harten, Harm Schepel et al, ‘Statement of Concern about
Planned Provisions on Investment Protection and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’ <www.kent.ac.uk/law/isds_treaty_consultation.
html> accessed 29 June 2015. See also José Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing Inter-
national Investment (Hague Academy of International Law 2011) 75-93; Muthucumaraswamy Sornara-
jah, ‘The Case against a Regime on International Investment Law’ in Leon E Trakman and Nicola W
Ranieri (eds), Regionalism in International Investment Law (OUP 2013) 475-498.
6. Burke-White and Von Staden 2010, supra note 4, 344-345.
7. Sarah Vasani, ‘Bowing to the Queen: Rejecting the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Investment Arbitration’ in Ian A Laird and Todd J Weiler (eds), Investment Treaty Arbitration and
 Evolution in Dispute Resolution
The current chapter investigates the deference debate in international investment law,
outlining the main arguments in favour and against the adoption of deference in
investor-state arbitration. It is found that the arguments on both sides depend on
broader perspectives on the function of investor-state arbitration and in particular
on whether investment protection belongs to the field of public or private law. Once
international investment law is understood from a public law perspective and the role
of investment tribunals is equated to that of domestic administrative and constitu-
tional courts, the adoption of deference is comprehensible. If, however, international
investment law is seen from a private law paradigm and the differences between
international arbitration and public law judicial review are emphasised, the adoption
of deference becomes more problematic. The current chapter discusses both para-
digms in some detail. It is then concluded that different characteristics of the current
investment protection regime point in different directions as to its public or private
law nature, and that a univocal definition of the ‘nature’ of international investment
law is more normative than empirical. It is also concluded, however, that one of the
main assertions of the public law paradigm is misleading, namely that arbitral review
should be equalled to the review exercised by domestic administrative and constitu-
tional courts. It is argued here that, unlike domestic judicial review, investment arbi-
tration does not serve to control the exercise of public power within the legal
parameters of a constitutional framework. It has a more narrow function, primarily
to provide investors with a speedy and international remedy to obtain redress for
unforeseen government conduct. Within this context, the logic of deference does
not apply in the same manner, because the domestic balance of power between var-
ious branches of government is not at risk.
. THE CONCEPT OF DEFERENCE IN DOMESTIC ADJUDICATION
In numerous municipal legal systems, courts accord deference to other branches of
government when they review their decisions.8 It entails a form of respect with
regard to the prerogatives and competences of other institutions. More specifically,
International Law (Vol 3, JurisNet 2010) 137-169; Kassi D Tallent, ‘The Tractor in the Jungle: Why Invest-
ment Arbitration Tribunals Should Reject a Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ in Laird and Weiler,
Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law (Vol 3, JurisNet 2010), pp. 111-135. Both authors focus
on ‘themargin of appreciation’, which I understand as an expression of deference. See Jeanrique Fahner,
‘TheMargin of Appreciation in Investor-State Arbitration: The Prevalence andDesirability of Discretion
andDeference’ in Nicos Lavranos, Ruth Kok et al (eds), 26Hague Yearbook of International Law 2013 (2014)
422-495.
8. See for a comparative account, Susana Galera (ed), Judicial Review. A Comparative Analysis inside the Euro-
pean Legal System (Council of Europe Publishing 2010). Of course, states adhere to different versions and
degrees of deference. The distinction between the common law and civil law traditions seems to be of
relevance in this regard. See A Stone Sweet and J Matthews, ‘Proportionality, Judicial Review, and
Global Constitutionalism’ in G Bongiovanni, G Sartor and C Valentini (eds), Reasonableness and Law
(Springer 2009) 203.
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deference implies that the reviewing institutionallocates additionalweight to the argu-
ments of the institutionunder review, ongroundsunrelated to themerits of the case.9 It
implies a certain limitation of the court’s intensity of review.10 Dependent on the legal
issue at stake, thismightmean that the court presumes the accuracy of a factual assess-
ment made by a government agency or the fairness of a certain policy adopted by a
representative body. The amount of deference granted by the court review increases
the likelihood that the conduct under review will be considered lawful.
In legal vocabulary, deference can take various forms. It can be expressed in the form
of a relative intensity of scrutiny, such as ‘lenient scrutiny’ or ‘intermediate scrutiny’.
Alternatively, deference can be translated into a lenient standard of review, such as
reasonableness. The Supreme Court of Canada described this standard in the follow-
ing way:
A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a deci-
sion reasonable. Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process and with whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomeswhich are defensible in respect
of the facts and the law. It is a deferential standard which requires respect for the legislative
choices to leave some matters in the hands of administrative decision makers.11
In the Supreme Court’s approach, ‘reasonableness’ functions as a normative bench-
mark against which the contested government conduct is being evaluated. Alterna-
tive benchmarks pose a negative criterion, such as the standard of ‘arbitrary and
capricious’ found in United States administrative law.12 It implies that the reviewing
court restricts its evaluation to a verification of whether the contested measure was
not arbitrary or capricious; once this condition is fulfilled, no further evaluation by
the court is required.13
9. Comp Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law. Deference and Propor-
tionality (OUP 2012) 21.
10. Paul Barker, ‘Investor-State Arbitration as International Public Law: Deference, Proportionality and the
Standard of Review’ in Ian A Laird et al (eds), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law (Vol 8,
Juris Publishing 2015) 254.
11. David Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick [2008] Supreme Court of Canada <http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-
csc/scc-csc/en/item/2408/index.do> accessed 29 June 2015. See Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in
Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (CUP 2012) 15-17.
12. Anna T Katselas, ‘Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferential Standard of Review? A Comparative
Analysis of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review and
the Fair and Equitable Treatment andArbitrary or DiscriminatoryMeasures Treaty Standards’ (2012) 34
Michigan Journal of International Law 1, 87-150.
13. See for a detailed analysis of different forms of deference in investor-state arbitration Esmé Shirlow,
‘Deference and Indirect Expropriation Analysis in International Investment Law: Observations on Cur-
rent Approaches and Frameworks for Future Analysis’ (2014) 29 ICSID Review 3, 595-626.
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Several arguments justify the adoption of deference in domestic public law adjudica-
tion. A primary justification is derived from the notion of the separation of powers,
which aims to distribute public power among different branches of government in
order to prevent an accumulation of power. If courts would engage in an extensive,
comprehensive evaluation of decisionsmade by other governmental institutions, they
would effectively substitute their own view for that of the institutions under review.
Deference prevents courts from encroaching upon the powers of other branches of
government in such a way.
A related argument in favour of deference points out that judicial institutions cannot
rely on a direct democratic mandate. It is often argued that the opinion of a small num-
ber of unelected judges should not be prioritised over the decisions adopted by insti-
tutions that can rely on direct democratic support. This argument depends on how one
understands the proper role of judicial review in democratic states. While opponents of
judicial review argue that unelected judges should never be empowered to overrule the
democratic will, proponents of judicial review argue that democracy is not synony-
mous with majority rule and that courts have the duty to protect minorities against
majorities. Deference allows courts to navigate between these two positions.14
In practice, the amount of deference granted by courts will differ depending on the
type of decision and institution that is under review.15 Institutions that rely on a direct
democratic mandate may be given more deference than institutions, which lack such
legitimation. Likewise, courts may be inclined to adopt a more lenient approach to
factual, technical or scientific assessments than to more legal determinations. Given
the fact that judges generally do not have expertise in these matters, it is often con-
sidered that they should defer to the findings of other, possibly specialised agencies.16
Another factor that is commonly taken into consideration is the stage of the judicial
proceedings. While a first instance court may grant a certain degree of deference to
14. See Benedikt Pirker, Proportionality Analysis and Models of Judicial Review (Europa Law Publishing 2013)
73-80.
15. Comp RosInvestCo UK Ltd v. Russia [2010] SCC V (079/2005) <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0720.pdf> accessed 29 June 2015 [274]: ‘one will have to take into account the dif-
ferent functions held by administrative organs and judicial organs of a state and the resulting differences
in their discretion when applying the law and in the appeals available against their decisions’.
16. This form of deference has been labelled ‘empirical deference’, in contrast to ‘normative deference’
which is granted because of the reasonsmentioned earlier. See Caroline Henckels, ‘The Role of the Stan-
dard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-State Arbitration’ in Gruszczynski and
Werner (eds) 2014, supra note 4, 115-116. See also Lukasz Gruszczynski and Valentina Vadi, ‘Standard
of Review and Scientific Evidence in WTO Law and International Investment Arbitration. Converging
Parallels?’ in Gruszczynski and Werner (eds) 2014, supra note 4, 152-172; Caroline E Foster, ‘Adjudica-
tion, Arbitration and the Turn to Public Law ‘Standards of Review’: Putting the Precautionary Principle
in the Crucible’ (2012) 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 3, 525-558; Yuka Fukunaga, ‘Standard
of Review and “Scientific Truths” in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Investment Arbitration’
(2012) 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 3, 559-576.
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another branch of government, an appeals court normally also attaches weight to the
first instance judgment. Arguably, this results in a double degree of deference at the
appeals level.17 Finally, andmost importantly, the degree of deference depends on the
applicable legal norm against which the contested government act is being reviewed.
Courts may consider it relevant to what extent the legal norm is precise and specific
and to what extent it leaves discretionary space to the relevant authorities. Whenever
courts review compliance with a discretionary norm, theymay consider its normative
flexibility an additional reason for deference.
. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION
Someof the arguments underpinningdeference in domestic public lawadjudication have
been applied in the context of investment arbitration as well. Stephan Schill has argued
that since investment tribunals have the same function as domestic courts in public law
disputes, tribunals have a sound reason for following their example: ‘The domestic court
parallel (…) suggests that deference in investment treaty arbitration is justified because
domestic courts, when reviewing government conduct, regularly apply a certain degree
of deference to implement the idea of the separation of powers’.18 Similarly, Caroline
Henckels has noted that investment arbitration claims ‘often involve legal issues that
would ordinarily be considered to be constitutional or administrative in nature, and raise
the issue of the horizontal dimension of the standard of review in terms of the balance of
power between different branches of government’.19 In addition to the separation of
powers, the argument of democratic legitimacy has also been raised in the context of
investment arbitration. Henckels notes that ‘the adversarial process cannot effectively
substitute democratic or other localised decision-making processes’.20 Similarly, Barnali
Choudhury asks: ‘if democratically elected governments enact public interest regulations
in response to public concerns or to address democratic ideals, how can investment arbi-
trators make decisions affecting such regulations without public input?’.21
17. Comp Lukasz Gruszczynski and Wouter Werner, ‘Introduction’ in Gruszczynski and Werner (eds)
2014, supra note 4, 1. See also Dean Spielmann, ‘Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of
Human Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European
Review?’ in C Barnard and M Gehring (eds), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (Vol 14, 2011-
2012 Hart 2012) 412-415.
18. Stephan W Schill, ‘Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of
Review’ (2012) 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 3, 588.
19. Henckels 2014, supra note 16, 121.
20. CarolineHenckels, ‘Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The Role of the Standard of
Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-State Arbitration’ (2013) 4 Journal of International
Dispute Settlement 1, 197-215.
21. Barnali Choudhury, ‘Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public
Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 3, 779.
See also, generally, Andreas von Staden, ‘Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review beyond the State:
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The reasons for granting deference on constitutional and democratic grounds may
becomemore pressingwhen the issue at stake requires arbitrators tomake value judg-
ments on controversial policy questions. Tribunals often insist that they are not
requested to review the quality of government decisions in the abstract. The CMS tri-
bunal, for example, dealingwith claims concerning Argentina’s response to the finan-
cial crisis of the early 2000s, ruled that its task was not ‘to pass judgment on the
economic policies adopted by Argentina’.22 However, when a tribunal is requested
to review government conduct against evaluative norms such as the fair and equitable
treatment standard, this inevitably involves a degree of value judgment. In such cir-
cumstances, it could be argued that arbitral tribunals should defer to the policy choi-
ces made by domestic institutions. Indeed, the tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada,
reviewing a Canadian import ban on toxic waste, held that an investment arbitration
tribunal:
does not have an open-ended mandate to second-guess government decision-making. Gov-
ernments have to make many potentially controversial choices. In doing so, they may
appear to have mademistakes, to have misjudged the facts, proceeded on the basis of a mis-
guided economic or sociological theory, placed too much emphasis on some social values
over others and adopted solutions that are ultimately ineffective or counterproductive. The
ordinary remedy, if there were one, for errors in modern governments is through internal
political and legal processes, including elections.23
The difficulties involved with reviewing legislation against investment treaty stan-
dards have been explicitly addressed by the tribunal in Paushok v. Mongolia. The tri-
bunal held that ‘actions by legislative assemblies are not beyond the reach of bilateral
investment treaties. A State is not immune from claims by foreign investors in con-
nection with legislation passed by its legislative body’.24 Nonetheless, the tribunal
also ruled that ‘the fact that a democratically elected legislature has passed legislation
that may be considered as ill-conceived, counter-productive and excessively burden-
some does not automatically allow to conclude that a breach of an investment treaty
has occurred’.25 This position arguably implies a degree of deference granted to the
institutions under review.26
Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional
Law 4, 1023-1049.
22. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina [2005] ICSID Case No ARB/01/8 <www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0184.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 [159].
23. SDMyers, Inc v. Canada [2000] UNCITRALMerits Award<www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0747.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 [261].
24. Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. Mongolia [2011] UNI-
CTRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu-
ments/ita0622.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 [298].
25. Ibid [299].
26. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties. A Legal and Economic Analysis (CUP
2014) 213–214: ‘The tribunal’s view that “ill-conceived, counter-productive and excessively
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The Paushok tribunal also expressed some sympathy toward the difficult tasks often
faced by legislative institutions. The tribunal acknowledged that ‘legislative assem-
blies around theworld spend a good part of their time amending substantive portions
of existing laws in order to adjust them to changing times or to correct serious mis-
takes that were made at the time of their adoption’.27 From this statement, one could
deduct another reason for deference, namely that governmental institutions are often
required tomake difficult decisions in circumstances that are complex but nonetheless
demand swift action. Several tribunals have held that arbitrators should not be too
critical of such decisions, especially when they could themselves benefit from the ben-
efit of hindsight. For instance, the Annulment Committee reviewing the Enron v.
Argentina award concerning the Argentine economic crisis wondered whether an
assessment of necessity should entail a degree of deference. It questioned whether
the credibility of the necessity claim should be determined ‘at the date of its award,
when the Tribunal may have the benefit of knowledge and hindsight that was not
available to the State at the time that it adopted the measure in question’.28 The
Committee appeared to be of the opinion that the tribunal’s evaluation should
be made ‘on the basis of information reasonably available at the time that the mea-
sure was adopted’ and with regard to the ‘margin of appreciation’ of the state.29 In a
similar vein, the Continental Casualty tribunal accorded a ‘significant margin of
appreciation’ to the respondent state: ‘a time of grave crisis is not the time for nice
judgments, particularly when examined by others with the disadvantage of
hindsight’.30
Various authors have argued that while deference is appropriate in the municipal
context, it is all the more so in the context of international arbitral review. It has been
pointed out that domestic judges are held accountable to the public in various ways,
for example through a legislative override. In investment-arbitration, however, there
are no comparable accountability mechanisms that tie arbitrators to the public of the
host state.31 On the contrary, it has been argued that arbitrators often lack linkages
with the host state’s social, political and legal environment. Tribunals are comprised
burdensome” legislation would not breach the FET standard clearly precludes substantive review
under the FET standard’.
27. Paushok v. Mongolia, supra note 24 [299].
28. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp v. Argentina [2010] ICSIDCaseNoARB/01/3,Decision on theApplication
for Annulment <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0299.pdf> accessed 1 June
2014 [372].
29. Ibid.
30. Continental Casualty Co v. Argentina [2008] ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award <www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf> accessed 3 June 2014 [181]. See also Gemplus SA
et al and Talsud SA v. Mexico [2010] ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/04/3 and ARB (AF)/04/4, Award
<www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0357.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 [6–26].
The tribunal accorded to the respondent ‘a generousmargin of appreciation, appliedwithout the benefit
of hindsight’.
31. Choudhury 2008, supra note 21, 818-819.
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of ‘non-tenured arbitrators who are not necessarily sufficiently embedded in the
social, economic and legal background of a case to undertake an informed balancing
exercise’.32 William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden have argued that, for this
reason, arbitrators should defer to assessments made by national authorities: ‘lack of
embeddedness suggests the need for greater deference to decisions made by institu-
tions that are more culturally, legally, and politically embedded’.33
Moreover, it has been argued that international tribunals should be inclined to accord
deference to respondent states on grounds of their sovereignty. Although the assump-
tion of obligations under international law is arguably a sovereign act itself that can-
not be circumvented on grounds of sovereignty, it could be argued that states are
entitled to deferencewith regard to the interpretation and application of treaty norms.
As the masters of the treaty, respondent States can be considered to have the final
authority on the interpretation of treaty provisions. Also the idea that State are sov-
ereign as concerns their domestic affairs has been used to defend the desirability of
deference. The S.D. Myers tribunal famously held that arbitral tribunals should
acknowledge ‘the high measure of deference that international law generally extends
to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders’, at
least when applying the minimum standard of treatment codified in Article 1105
NAFTA.34
Some observers have argued that the concept of deference has become widely
accepted by courts and tribunals in diverse fields of international law.35 Along
these lines, the Continental Casualty tribunal, referring to the approach of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, held that ‘a certain deference’ with regard to the
application of general standards ‘may well be by now a general feature of interna-
tional law also in respect of the protection of foreign investors under BITs’.36 This
allegedly widespread adoption of deference has been explained with reference to
the awareness of courts and tribunals of their limited powers vis-à-vis respondent
states.37
32. Pirker 2013, supra note 14, 348.
33. Burke-White and Von Staden 2010, supra note 6, 332-333.
34. Myers v. Canada, supra note 23 [263].
35. Yuval Shany, ‘Towards a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ (2006) 16
European Journal of International Law 5, 907-940. Valentina Vadi and Lukasz Gruszczynskzi argue that
investment tribunals should follow the example of WTO dispute settlement bodies concerning defer-
ence. Valentina Vadi and Lukasz Gruszczynskzi, ‘Standards of Review in International Investment
Law and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the Commonweal’ (2013) 16 Journal of International
Economic Law 3, 613–633.
36. Continental Casualty v. Argentina, supra note 30 [footnote 270].
37. Leonhardsen 2014, supra note 4, 139: deference is ‘a rational response to the problem of institutional
weakness that characterises international courts and tribunals in times when (…) States and those
who influence States voice strong criticism’.
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With regard to deference in the context of factual and scientific determinations, it has
been noted that arbitral tribunals normally lack the expertise to second-guess deter-
minations made by domestic agencies. Unlike domestic institutions, tribunals are not
supported by bureaucracies or specialised agencies that can compete with those of
respondent states. For this reason, national authorities arguably deserve a degree
of deference. As noted by Stephan Schill, the expertise of domestic authorities may
‘speak in favour of respecting factual determinations made by domestic institutions,
rather than supporting full-blown review by investment treaty tribunals’ and of
‘respecting science-based determinations made by domestic agencies’.38 In the case
of Glamis Gold v. United States, the respondent state raised exactly this argument: ‘a
high measure of deference to the facts and factual conclusions seems the only way
to prevent investment tribunals from becoming science courts’.39
A circumstantial argument for deference applies once the contested government act
has already been reviewed by domestic courts. If an investor brings an investment
treaty claim after domestic remedies have been pursued, this usually means that
the tribunal has to rule on the same matter as domestic courts before it.40 In this sit-
uation, the tribunal may consider that the contested government act has already been
reviewed by a presumably independent judicial institution before the treaty claim
was brought, which arguably implies a ground for deference. However, investors
may also complain that the manner in which domestic courts applied domestic
law constituted a violation of treaty rights in itself, for example under the fair and
equitable treatment standard or under a claim for denial of justice. This requires
the tribunal to review the domestic courts’ application of domestic law. As tribunals
have often acknowledged, however, they are not meant to operate as courts of appeal,
while domestic courts may be presumed to know the domestic law of their legal sys-
tem, at least more so than international arbitral tribunals. This presumption is argu-
ably a strong ground for deference whenever tribunals are required to review the
domestic courts’ application of municipal law.
. ARGUMENTS AGAINST DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION
In response to the various argument raised by academic observers and respondent
states in favour of deference, opponents have brought up various reasons thatmilitate
against the adoption of deference. On a general level, it has been emphasised that by
38. Schill 2012, supra note 18, 602.
39. Glamis Gold v. United States, supra note 3 [594].
40. Treaty standards often provide similar protection as municipal standards: ‘the protective provisions in
international investment agreements (IIAs) cover grounds similar to that covered by administrative law
or state liability law in municipal orders’. Van Aken 2010, supra note 1, 721.
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adopting arbitration clauses in investment treaties, states have themselves empowe-
red arbitral tribunals to interpret and apply treaty norms. As noted by the Renta 4
tribunal, ‘when agreeing to the jurisdiction of international tribunals, states perforce
accept that those jurisdictions will exercise their judgment’.41 In a similar vein, the
Enron tribunal held:
Judicial determination of the compliance with the requirements of international law in this
matter should not be understood as if arbitral tribunals might be wishing to substitute for
the functions of the sovereign State, but simply responds to the duty that in applying inter-
national law they cannot fail to give effect to legal commitments that are binding on the
parties and interpret the rules accordingly.42
Admittedly, the mandate given to tribunals to settle disputes between states and
investors does not yet tell them how to exercise their review. It could be argued, how-
ever, that deference constitutes a constraint of this mandate, which should be explic-
itly ordered by the relevant treaty.43
More specific objections against deference relate to the reasons which compelled sta-
tes to grant foreign investors access to international arbitration. It should be noted that
investment arbitration provides investors with a unique remedy to challenge host
state conduct as an alternative to domestic courts. The ICSID Convention itself
acknowledges that investment disputes are normally capable of being settled through
domestic proceedings.44 This raises the question of why states offer international arbi-
tration as an alternative to domestic court litigation.45 A common answer to this ques-
tion points to the vulnerable position of the foreign investor in the environment of the
host state. As noted by Thomas Wälde in his Separate Opinion to the Thunderbird
41. Quasar de Valores SICAV SA, Orgor de Valores SICAV SA, GBI 9000 SICAV SA, ALOS 34 SL (Renta 4) v.
Russia [2012] SCC V (024/2007) Award <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita1075.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 [179]. The award is commonly named after the first original claimant
that was denied standing by the tribunal in preliminary award.
42. Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentina [2007] ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 <www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 [340].
43. James Egerton-Vernon, ‘Is Investment Treaty Arbitration a Mechanism to Second-Guess Government’s
Exercise of Administrative Discretion: Public Law or Lex Investoria’ in Laird et al (eds) 2010, supra note
10, 201-233; Paine 2015, supra note 4, 346.
44. ICSID Convention Preamble: ‘(…) Bearing in mind the possibility that from time to time disputes may
arise in connectionwith such investment between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting
States; Recognizing that while such disputes would usually be subject to national legal processes, inter-
national methods of settlement may be appropriate in certain cases (…)’.
45. See Leon E Trakman, ‘Australia’s Rejection of Investor-State Arbitration: A Sign of Global Change’ in
Leon E Trakman andNicolaWRanieri (eds),Regionalism in International Investment Law (OUP 2013) 356-
362; Christoph Schreuer, ‘DoWeNeed Investment Arbitration?’ in Jean E Kalicki and Anna Joubin-Bret
(eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System. Journeys for the 21st Century (Brill 2015) 879-
889.
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Award, this position is frequently one of ‘structural weakness’, because the investor is
subjected to the host state’s regulatory, administrative and judicial powers.46 Admit-
tedly, this hierarchical relationship applies to domestic investors as well, but there are
certain aspects of the foreign investor’s position that may render his situation worse.
Firstly, a foreign investor may fear that domestic institutions are biased against him
because of his foreign nationality. Secondly, even when such bias is absent, foreign
investor may be at a disadvantage in the municipal legal order, because the legal,
social, political and cultural environment of the host state is alien to him.47 When sta-
tes adopt arbitration clauses in investment treaties, they seek to rebalance the inves-
tor’s position by offering him access to an international, neutral forum unrelated to
the host state itself.
Individuals or corporations engaging in foreign investment enter the situation of
‘structural weakness’ described byWälde of their own free will. When the Australian
government renounced the practice of investor-state arbitration, it concluded: ‘If Aus-
tralian businesses are concerned about sovereign risk in Australian trading partner
countries, they will need to make their own assessments about whether they want
to commit to investing in those countries’.48 It should be noted, however, that states
who provide international investment protection do so because they want to attract
foreign investment. When states offer potential investors the right to initiate interna-
tional arbitration, they intend to enhance their credibility and attractiveness as host
state.49 The right to initiate arbitration is supposed to sooth investor concerns over
political risk, because potential arbitration claims might prevent the host state from
adopting unlawful measures or at least because the arbitration process might provide
the investor with compensation in case the preventive effect would fail.
If understood in this way, the purpose of investor-state arbitration could be consid-
ered antagonistic to the concept of deference. Access to international arbitration
46. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico [2005] UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion of Thomas
Wälde <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0432.pdf> accessed 31 October
2014 [12].
47. Thomas Wälde, ‘The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration’ in P Kahn and T Wälde (eds), New
Aspects of International Investment Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 54-55.
48. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Gillard Government Trade Policy
Statement: Trading our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity’ (2011) <www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/
b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-Trade-Policy-Statement.aspx> accessed
31 October 2014.
49. See Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 67-130,
describing the conclusion of investment treaties between capital-exporting and capital-importing states
as a ‘grand bargain: a promise of protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the
future’. Some authors have described the development of the BIT network in more critical terms. See
e.g. Kate Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding
of Capital (CUP 2013).
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enables investors to bring complaints in a dispute settlement forum that is unrelated
to the host state. As noted by Kassi Tallent, ‘the assurance that the investor may have
his or her case decided by an impartial, international tribunal is probably the most
important promise offered by the state in exchange for the expected benefit of foreign
investment’.50 The logic of deference does not fit with this rationale behind investor-
state arbitration. Deference implies that the power to interpret treaty requirements is
being shifted back to the host state authorities. By granting deference to the respon-
dent state, tribunals weaken the independent nature of their review. For the same rea-
sons, the alleged lack of embeddedness in the social, economic and cultural
background of the host state which distinguishes arbitrators from domestic judges
and which has been lamented by Burke-White and von Staden cannot be considered
problematic. On the contrary, the lack of ties to the host state is precisely the reason
why arbitrators are chosen to review a dispute.
Investment arbitration does not only aspire to be independent, but it also assumes
that the parties involved are equal before the tribunal. SarahVasani argues that ‘a fun-
damental principle of the investment arbitration system irrespective of the fact that
sovereign States are involved is that both parties are to be treated equally’.51 Defer-
ence, however, accords extraweight to the views of one of the parties, namely the host
state. By adopting considerations of deference like those common in domestic courts,
investment tribunals would reintroduce the inequality between the parties that was a
main reason for establishing the arbitration system in the first place.52
Arguments related to the normative openness of investment treaty standards have
been raised on both sides of the debate. On the one hand, it has been argued that
respondent states are entitled to deference, because common investment treaty stan-
dards are open-ended and leave a wide discretionary space to host state authorities.53
On the other hand, it has been observed that since treaty standards pose only mini-
mum obligations for host states, the review exercised by tribunals is already of a very
limited nature, which reduces the need for further deference. This is the approach
50. Tallent, ‘The Tractor in the Jungle’, supra note 7, 130. See alsoGas Natural SDG v. Argentina [2005] ICSID
CaseNoARB/03/10 [29]: ‘assurance of independent international arbitration is an important – perhaps
the most important – element in investor protection’.
51. Vasani 2010, supra note 7, 164.
52. Moreover, it has been argued that in practice the state always enjoys advantages over the investor. For
instance, the state has various ways of interfering with arbitration cases that the investor lacks. Charles
N Brower, ‘W(h)ither International Commercial Arbitration. TheGoff Lecture 2007’ (2008) 24Arbitration
International: The Journal of LCIAWorldwide Arbitration 2, 189-190. This argument renders deference even
more undesirable. See also ThomasW.Wälde, ‘Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration under
the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals’Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively, the
Equality of Arms’ (2010) 26 Arbitration International 1, 3-42.
53. See Anne van Aken, ‘International Investment Law between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract
Theory Analysis’ (2009) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 2, 527-531.
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taken by theGlamis Gold tribunal. It disagreedwith the respondent ‘that domestic def-
erence in national court systems is necessarily applicable to international tribunals’.54
The tribunal found ‘the standard of deference to already be present in the standard as
stated, rather than being additive to that standard’, because a breach of Article 1105
NAFTA required ‘something greater than mere arbitrariness, something that is sur-
prising, shocking, or exhibits a manifest lack of reasoning’.55 The reasoning of theGla-
mis Gold tribunal shows the complexities of the relationship between deference and
the flexibility of the applicable norm.While some observers argue that a flexible norm
is a reason for granting deference, the Glamis Gold approach implies that since the
applicable norm is already lenient, there is no need for ‘additional’ deference.56
Specific arguments have been raised against deference on grounds of the separation of
powers and the democratic legitimacy of host state measures. It has been pointed out
that in various host states, democratic modes of decision-making are absent and
administrative agencies lack expertise or suffer from corruption. In those circum-
stances, the logic of the separation of powers becomes problematic. Moreover, even
when domestic decision-making procedures reflect the popular will, this may have
less relevance in the context of international investment law than in the domestic con-
stitutional scheme. Investment treaty protection may actually be offered precisely to
protect foreign investors from the popular will in certain circumstances, since foreign
investments are common targets of domestic discontent, especially in times of eco-
nomic crisis.57
Furthermore, it has been emphasised that foreign investors do not participate in
domestic decision-making processes. Domestic public law courts grant deference
to other branches of government in order to respect the democratic will and also
because discontented citizens have other means to advance their cause, such as their
vote. Foreign investors do not have the same position. As noted by Kassi Tallent, ‘the
investor is an outsider to the democratic processes influencing the development and
application of state regulatory measures’.58 The Tecmed tribunal, reviewing the clos-
ing of an industrial waste landfill, expressed the same rationale:
the foreign investor has a reduced or nil participation in the taking of the decisions that affect
it, partly because the investors are not entitle to exercise political rights reserved to the
54. Glamis Gold v. United States, supra note 3 [617].
55. Ibid.
56. See for the same argument Rahim Moloo and Justin M Jacinto, ‘Standards of Review and Reviewing
Standards: Public Interest Regulation in International Investment Law’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook
on International Investment Law and Policy 2011-2012 (OUP 2013) 539-567.
57. Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System’
(2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 1, 68; Vasani 2010, supra note 7, 167. M Sornarajah,
The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, CUP 2010) 71-72.
58. Tallent, ‘The Tractor in the Jungle’, supra note 7, 130.
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nationals of the State, such as voting for the authorities that will issue the decisions that
affect such investors.59
The investor’s exclusion from domestic politics arguably militates against the adop-
tion of domestic concepts such as the separation of powers within the context of
investment law. Within the domestic scheme, judicial deference expresses respect
towards the decisions taken by other institutions with democratic involvement.
Because foreign investors are not similarly involved in domestic decision-making pro-
cedures, the logic of deference cannot be applied in the same way in investor-state
arbitration.
Various tribunals have rejected the argument that deference has become a general fea-
ture of international adjudication. When the respondent in Siemens v. Argentina
invoked the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the tribunal held that
this Court applied a ‘margin of appreciation not found in customary international
law’.60 The Renta 4 tribunal also objected to the idea that the concept of the ‘margin
of appreciation’ should be applied in the context of investment law. Comparing the
protection offered by a BIT to the protection offered by human rights treaties, the tri-
bunal held:
Human rights conventions establish minimum standards to which all individuals are enti-
tled irrespective of any act of volition on their part, whereas investment-protection treaties
contain undertakings which are explicitly designed to induce foreigners to make invest-
ments in reliance upon them. It therefore makes sense that the reliability of an instrument
of the latter kind should not be diluted by precisely the same notions of ‘margins of appre-
ciation’ that apply to the former.61
According to the tribunal, the purpose of human rights protection on the one hand
and investment protection on the other hand is too different to allow a cross-regime
application of the margin of appreciation.
In general, it appears that tribunals are reluctant to accord deference to the determi-
nations made by respondent states. On the basis of an investigation of 243 investment
arbitration awards, Gus van Harten has concluded that arbitrators are more likely to
engage in unrestrained review than domestic courts. According to van Harten, tribu-
nals ‘assumed far-reaching authority to oversee states intensively in relation to legis-
lative and executive decision-making and in spite of the overlapping role of other
59. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. Mexico (2003) ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2 <www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0854.pdf> accessed 15 September 2015 [122].
60. Siemens AG v. Argentina (2007) ICSIDCase NoARB/02/8<www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0790.pdf> accessed 15 September 2015 [354].
61. Renta 4 v. Russia, supra note 41 [22].
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adjudicators’.62 He concludes that the current tendency among arbitrators is ‘to assert
explicitly or implicitly an expansive role for themselves to decide whether the choices
and conduct of another decision-maker were correct’.63
. THE FUNCTION OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: PRIVATE LAW
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT OR PUBLIC LAW JUDIC IAL REVIEW?
The ultimate answer to the question of whether investment tribunals should defer to
domestic authorities seems to be related to broader perspectives on the nature or char-
acter of investor-state arbitration. In particular, it appears that the concept of defer-
ence is more widely appreciated by observers who emphasise the public law
characteristics of investor-state arbitration, while observers familiar with a private
law perspective are more critical of its adoption.64
It has often been pointed out that investor-state arbitration is modelled after commer-
cial arbitration.65 International commercial arbitration, developed in order to provide
parties in cross-border business disputes with a speedy and presumably neutral adju-
dication mechanism, has several features which states consider useful for the settle-
ment of investment disputes as well. Comparedwith court adjudication, arbitration is
hailed for its speediness, neutrality and the possible confidentiality of the proceed-
ings. States endorse commercial arbitration out of respect for ‘the autonomous deci-
sions of commercial actors to displace the courts’ competence and replace it with a
mutually constructed alternative’.66
Investor-state arbitration shares many of the procedural characteristics of commercial
arbitration.67 In both types of proceedings, disputing parties agree to bring their dis-
pute before an ad hoc tribunal, of which all or some of the members are chosen by the
62. Gus van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration (OUP 2013) 17. See also Gus van Harten, ‘Judicial Restraint in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Restraint Based on Relative Suitability’ (2014) 5 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1, 5-39.
63. Ibid 162. This does of course not necessarily mean that the state is found in breach. See Susan D Franck,
‘Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 86 North Carolina Law Review 1
(2007) 84, finding ‘reasonably equivalent investor and state win rates’.
64. Anthea Roberts, ‘The Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011)
International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series No 16 (2011) 170-180; Julian Arato, ‘The
Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International
Law 3, 555; Egerton-Vernon 2010, supra note 43, 201-233.
65. Barton Legum, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration’s Contribution to International Commercial Arbitration
– The Effects of Investment Treaty Arbitration on International Commercial Arbitration, and their Sig-
nificance’ (2005) 60 Dispute Resolution Journal 3, 70-75.
66. Van Harten 2007, supra note 2, 61.
67. For some differences, see Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, ‘Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Dif-
ferent Are They Today? The Lalive Lecture 2012’ (2012) 28 Arbitration International 4, 577-590.
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parties. The tribunal is empowered to rule on its own jurisdiction and the outcome of
the proceedings is a damage award that is binding on the parties. The isolation from
court review that characterises commercial arbitration occurs in investor-state arbitra-
tion as well, since investor-state awards cannot be set aside by domestic courts, except
in cases of serious procedural shortcomings.68
The private law origins of investor-state arbitration are widely acknowledged. More-
over, some authors argue that the type of obligations at stake in international
investment law are of a private nature.MosheHirsch, for example, contends that ‘inter-
national investment law emphasises the private law aspects of the relations between
host governments and foreign investors’.69 According to Hirsch, the primary inquiry
undertaken in the context of investment arbitration focuses on obligations deriving
from promises made by state authorities and from the regulatory framework as it exis-
ted when the investment was negotiated and entered into. For this reason, Hirsch
argues, international investment law ‘largely aims to protect various private lawunder-
takings that are made between the host state and the foreign investor’.70 From this per-
spective, investment arbitration does not serve to evaluate the lawfulness of government
in the abstract, but only to verify whether the assurances relied on by the investor were
complied with.
In spite of the private law roots of international arbitration, observers have started to
stress the public law characteristics of international investment law.71 A first element
that has been emphasised in this regard is the source of the consent to arbitration on
the side of the state. Historically, most arbitrations between a state and a foreign
investor depended on arbitration clauses provided in investment contracts.72 The
main innovation of the current international investment law regime was the codifica-
tion of general consent to arbitration in investment protection treaties.73 As a result of
this general consent, any party who fell within the definitions of the treaty became
68. Lars Markert and Helene Bubrowski, ‘National Setting Aside Proceedings in Investment Arbitration’ in
Marc Bungenberg et al (eds), International Investment Law. A Handbook (Hart 2015) 1460-1481.
69. Moshe Hirsch, ‘Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Francesco Francioni, Human Rights in International Investment Law and
Arbitration (OUP 2009) 114.
70. Ibid 109.
71. Gus van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Adminis-
trative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 1, 121-150; Santiago Montt, State Liability in
Investment Treaty Arbitration (Hart 2009); Stephan W Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s
Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’ (2011) 52
Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (2011) 57-102. See also Barry Leon and John Terry, ‘Special Con-
siderations When a State is a Party to International Arbitration. Why Arbitrating against a State is Dif-
ferent: 12 Key Reasons’ (2006) 61 Dispute Resolution Journal 1, 68-76.
72. Van Harten 2007, supra note 2, 63.
73. See Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law. Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart 2008) 32-33, speak-
ing about a ‘silent revolution in foreign investment law’.
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entitled to initiate an arbitration claim. According to van Harten, this innovation
transformed ‘international arbitration from a form of reciprocally consensual adjudi-
cation into a governing arrangement’.74 General consent to arbitration has created a
new layer of arbitral control of government conduct.
A second characteristic of the current international investment law regime, which is
emphasised in the public law paradigm is the subject matter of common investment
disputes. It has been argued that these disputes are not limited to contractual disputes
concerning the state’s private conduct, but instead involve its exercise of public power
and potentially affect entire populations.75 As noted by Stephan Schill, investment
arbitration disputes often concern domestic policy-making, as is evident from cases
concerningwater concessions, affirmative action programs, environmental protection
measures, public health programs and economic reforms.76 In a similar vein, Burke-
White and von Staden note that investment arbitration is not restricted to ‘merely
technical questions’, but ‘frequently implicates the scope of the regulatory powers
of the respondent state’.77 Consequently, investment arbitration engages with contes-
ted policy choices, with the balancing of private and public interests and with the sta-
te’s general definition of the public good. These issues are commonly considered to
fall within the scope of public law. A related argument concerns the relationship
between the different parties involved. Investment treaties are signed between equal,
sovereign states and disputing parties are considered equal before arbitral tribunals.
In their everyday relationship, however, the relationship between the disputing
parties is one between sovereign and subordinate. The law that governs this sort
of relationship is typically considered public law.
A third characteristic of international investment law that allegedly demonstrates its
public law nature is the contribution of investment arbitration awards to the devel-
opment of international law. Stephan Schill has argued that international investment
law is not only concerned with ‘backing up private ordering between foreign inves-
tors and host states’, but instead with ‘providing a legal framework for a public inter-
national economic order’.78 While investment arbitration awards do not formally
have the value of precedent, in reality awards are often quoted and discussed by sub-
sequent tribunals ruling on similar matters. This is not surprising given the fact that
different cases often concern similarly phrased treaty provisions or standards of cus-
tomary international law. Consequently, although no formal rule of precedent exists
74. Van Harten 2007, supra note 2, 64.
75. Barker 2015, supra note 10, 238: ‘The central premise of this paper is that investor-state arbitration can
directly affect the lives of entire populations who are not parties to, and are far removed from, any par-
ticular case’.
76. Schill 2012, supra note 18, 577-578.
77. Burke-White and Von Staden 2010, supra note 4, 284.
78. Schill 2010, supra note 2, 3.
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in international investment law, in reality awards have an impact that goes beyond
the specific case at hand.79
In conjunction with the adoption of a public law paradigm in international investment
law, observes have started to define the function of investment arbitration in terms of
‘judicial review’.80 Federico Ortino, for example, has argued that ‘the main object of
an investment treaty is the establishment of a system of judicial review reserved for for-
eign investors’.81 Similarly, Stephan Schill has proposed that investor-state arbitration
should be viewed as ‘more akin to administrative or constitutional judicial review than
to commercial arbitration’.82 Arbitration allows the investor, as a subordinate of the state,
to challenge government action. Within the domestic scheme, such challenges are nor-
mally dealt with by domestic courts who are empowered to engage in administrative
or constitutional judicial review. Gus van Harten summarised the point as follows:
In many states, adjudication plays an important and expanding role in regulating relations
between individuals and the state. One of the core functions of the judiciary is to constrain
the exercise of sovereign authority by executive government and, undermany constitutions,
by the legislature. When a judge invokes his or her public law competence to resolve a dis-
pute between the state and a person or organization that is subject to regulation by the state,
he or she determines matters such as the legality of governmental activity, the degree to
which individuals should be protected from regulation, and the appropriate role of the state.
The role of arbitrators under investment treaties is essentially the same.83
The public law paradigm in international investment law seems to have found wide
acceptance in academia. This has clear consequences for the debate on deference.
Once investor-state arbitration is understood as a judicial reviewmechanism in a pub-
lic law field, the case for deference becomes much stronger, while the arguments
against deference are sometimes being rejected as an obsolete insistence on the private
law origins of international arbitration.84
79. Comp Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh (2009) ICSID Case No ARB/07/7 <www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0734.pdf> accessed 15 September 2015 [90]: ‘The Tribunal considers that it is
not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion that itmust pay due consideration
to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it
has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the
specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to
the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the
community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law’.
80. See e.g. International Thunderbird v. Mexico, Opinion Thomas Wälde, supra note 46 [13].
81. Federico Ortino, ‘The Investment Treaty System as Judicial Review’ (2013) 24 American Review of Inter-
national Arbitration 3, 443.
82. Schill 2010, supra note 2, 4.
83. Van Harten 2007, supra note 2, 71.
84. Other issues to which the distinction matters are e.g., transparency, third-party participation and the
relevance of norms originating from other fields of international law, such as human rights or
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It should be noted, however, that the public law paradigm in international investment
law is not without weaknesses. For instance, it leaves unclear why states opted for the
mechanism of arbitration in the first place. As noted by Anthea Roberts, ‘public law
proponents assume that the choice of arbitration was not intended to import private
law concepts or approaches into the field, or that, if it were, this was a mistake that
should be rectified by the introduction of an international investment court’.85
Instead, it could be argued that states deliberately chose for international arbitration,
because theywanted the international remedy reserved for foreign investors to have a
more narrow function than public law adjudication.86
In sum, it appears that some characteristics of investor-state arbitration seem to dem-
onstrate its public law nature, while other characteristics fit better in a private law par-
adigm.87 Arguably, investment law ‘is not a subgenre of an existing discipline. It is
dramatically different from anything previously known in the international sphere’.88
Consequently, discussions on whether the public law or the private law paradigm pro-
vide the best conceptual framework for understanding investor-state arbitration cannot
be concluded on the basis of empirical arguments alone. Since the system comprises
both public and private law characteristics, observers will emphasise the relevance
of those elements that fit with their normative assumptions.89
Nonetheless, it is concluded here that some of the public law arguments are mislead-
ing, notably the idea that investment arbitration is a form of judicial review. In spite of
the similarities between investment arbitration and municipal administrative and
constitutional adjudication, it appears that the purpose of both types of proceedings
is fundamentally different. It seems that while the purpose of domestic court
environmental law. Roberts 2013, supra note 57, 65. Answers to questions related to consistency and
precedent may also depend on the chosen paradigm. See Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’,
73 Fordham Law Review 1521 (2004-2005). See also Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan W Schill, ‘Public
Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with the State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest –
the Concept of Proportionality’ in Schill 2010, supra note 1, 75-104.
85. Roberts 2013, supra note 57, 68.
86. Katselas 2012, supra note 12, 147: ‘the use of arbitration rather than adjudication is meaningful and sug-
gests that states may have had a dispute-settlement rather than an administrative review function in
mind when they signed onto the system’; Egerton-Vernon 2010, supra note 43, 231: investor-state arbi-
tration ‘was deliberately designed by States to be a hybrid system, a lex investoria incorporating a private
international arbitration model designed to address disputes that often involve issues of public inter-
national law’.
87. StephanWittich, ‘State Responsiblity’ in Bungenberg 2015, supra note 68, 37, noting the ‘hybrid nature of
investment law’.
88. Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration without Privity’ (1995), 10 ICSID Review 2, 232. Quoted in Roberts 2013, supra
note 57, 94.
89. See for a general argument against the distinction between public and private international law Alex
Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law. Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the Inter-
national Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (CUP 2009).
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adjudication is to ensure the legitimacy of the exercise of public power, the purpose of
investment arbitration is only to compensate foreign investors for damages that, if
foreseen, would have prevented them from investing.
The narrow purpose of investment arbitration in comparison to domestic court adju-
dication can be demonstratedwith reference to the remedies available in both types of
proceedings. As noted byAnne vanAken, it is helpful to distinguish between primary
remedies, which have a preventive or restorative function and include declaratory
actions and injunctions, and secondary remedies, which are directed at pecuniary
damages. Van Aken contends: ‘whereas municipal legal orders tend to be reluctant
to grant pecuniary damages and require the use of (preventive) primary remedies
against the (illegal) act per se, international investment law most heavily relies on
ex post secondary remedies’.90 A similar point is raised by Andreas Kulick, who
argues that in domestic courts the greatest concern of the state is to avoid ‘the stigma
of unlawfulness’. In investor-state arbitration, on the other hand, the host state is
mostly concerned with avoiding liability, according to Kulick.91 Of course, arbitral
tribunals cannot award compensation without the finding of a treaty violation, while
plaintiffs in domestic courts often also seekmonetary compensation for unlawful gov-
ernment conduct. This does not mean, however, that the primary purpose of both
mechanisms is similar. Compensation appears to be the core aim of investment arbi-
tration, while public law adjudication has a broader role in ensuring the legitimacy of
public governance. As noted by José Alvarez, the purpose of investor-state dispute
settlement is not to force states to correct their mistakes, but ‘to secure a compensatory
remedy for past harms done’.92
In theory, investment tribunals have the formal power to order other remedies than
compensation, but in reality this rarely occurs, for several reasons.93 Firstly, by def-
inition an investor-state arbitration claim is related to an investment, so the ultimate
interest of the applicant is probably a monetary interest. Moreover, investment arbi-
tration claims are mostly raised once the investment has already been terminated and
the investor’s interests have been reduced to obtaining compensation. Secondly, the
enforcement of secondary remedies is more feasible than that of primary remedies
granted at the international level. A pecuniary award is enforceable through domestic
90. Van Aken 2010, supra note 1, 723.
91. Andreas Kulick, ‘Book Review’ of Schill, supra note 1 (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 3,
922.
92. Alvarez 2011, supra note 5, 52.
93. Pirker 2013, supra note 14, 347; Christoph Schreuer, ‘Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration’
(2004) 20 Arbitration International 4, 325-332; Berk Demirkol, ‘Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion’ (2015) 6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 2, 403-426. See for an argument in favour of non-
pecuniary remedies Gisele Stephens-Chu, ‘Is it Always All About theMoney? The Appropriateness of
Non-Pecuniary Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2014) 30 Arbitration International 4, 661-
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courts on grounds of the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention, while a
primary remedy requires more readiness to cooperate on the side of the state.94 Some
tribunals have explicitly refused to order other remedies than compensation. The tri-
bunal in LG&E v. Argentina, for example, held that it was not empowered to order a
‘modification of the current legal situation by annulling or enacting legislative and
administrative measures’.95 This would imply an ‘undue interference’ with the
respondent’s sovereignty’.96 Because tribunals are reluctant to engage in such inter-
ference, investment awards have normally no impact on the domestic legitimacy of
the contested measure. This distinguishes awards from domestic court judgments,
which can result in the nullification or invalidation of legislation or administrative
measures.
It has been argued that even when arbitral tribunals order only monetary awards, the
sheer amount of compensation may have serious consequences for the host state. A
famous example is the case of CME v. Czech Republic. According to Van Harten, ‘the
award of $353 million placed an enormous strain on the public finances of the Czech
Republic’, equalling the country’s entire health-care budget.97 Financial burdens of
this kind may effectively force the host state to change its policies, for example when
there is a risk of further claims by other investors in similar circumstances.98 In gen-
eral, however, it seems that tribunals do not often order large amounts of compensa-
tion. Investors commonly obtain only a fraction of the amounts claimed, if anything at
all. Of a total number of 82 cases analysed by Susan Franck in 2007, only 22 resulted in
a damage award and only in 4 cases the tribunals awarded more than $10 million.99
On the basis of this analysis, Franck suggests that the average amount of damages
awarded by investor-state arbitration tribunals is comparable to those granted by
other international adjudicators.100 Moreover, even when tribunals award damages,
host states have various means to resist enforcement and prevent the investor from
recovering their money. Consequently, it seems that although awards in theory have
the potential to substantially affect host state policies, in reality this may hardly ever
happen.
94. Van Aken 2010, supra note 1, 734. See also Article 54(1) ICSID Convention. Stephan Wittich, ‘Invest-
ment Arbitration: Remedies’ in Bungenberg 2015, supra note 68, 1401-1402.
95. LG&E Energy Corp v. Argentina [2007] ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Award <www.italaw.com/docu-
ments/LGEEnglish.pdf> accessed 1 July 2015 [87]. See, critically,Wittich 2015, supra note 94, 1398-1400.
96. LG&E v. Argentina, supra note 95 [87]. But see Thomas W Walde and Borzu Sabahi, ‘Compensation,
Damages, andValuation’ in PeterMuchlinski et al (eds), TheOxfordHandbook of International Investment
Law (OUP 2008) 1055-1056, pointing out that an order to re-do a procedurally flawed decision may be
less intrusive than a large damages award.
97. CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic [2003] UNCITRAL, Final Award <www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0180.pdf> accessed 15 September 2015; VanHarten 2007, supra note
2, 7.
98. Choudhury 2008, supra note 21, footnote 319.
99. Franck 2007, supra note 63, 55-66.
100. Ibid 58.
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The review exercised by domestic administrative and constitutional courts forms part
of the checks and balances that have been developedwithin systems of government in
order to prevent powerful actors to seize public power at the cost of other actors and
to prevent a tyranny of the majority. Together with other branches of governments,
the domestic court system plays a specific, balanced role in the legitimisation of the
exercise of public power. For this reason, judicial review is embedded in institutional
structures that ensure the continuity and consistency of jurisprudence, as well as a
due respect for the prerogatives of other branches of government. Arguably, inves-
tor-state arbitration does not form part of these constitutional arrangements.101
Rather, it is an external mechanism provided with the mere purpose of soothing
investor concerns over the quality of domestic adjudication. It is an extra-constitu-
tional form of review of government conduct, provided exclusively for the benefit
of foreign investors and without repercussions for the domestic legitimacy of gover-
nance. For this reason, international investment protection has been compared to a
political risk insurance.102 As noted by Benedikt Pirker, investment arbitration pur-
sues ‘the logic of an insurance policy for investors which offers the determination
of a breach and calculation of compensation ex post’.103 Consequently, the main task
of tribunals is to provide appropriate compensation, rather than to re-assess ‘the
balancing of interests undertaking by a legislator or administrator in order to suggest
a “better” balance’.104
The limited scope and function of arbitral review distinguishes investment arbitration
from public law review, even though both types of proceedings involve the evalua-
tion of government conduct. Whereas judicial review serves to control the legitimate
exercise of public power by legislative and executive branches of governmentwithin a
constitutional framework, investment arbitration entails a mechanism specifically
aimed at settling disputes between a host state and an investor concerning the for-
mer’s treaty commitments.105 This difference affects the desirability of deference in
101. This seems to distinguish investment arbitration from standing international courts, such as the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, theWorld Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Bodies and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, which have a more ‘constitutional’ role. See Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L
Brunell, ‘Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes. The Politics of Majoritarian
Activism in the ECHR, the EU, and the WTO’ (2013) Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper
4625 <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4625> accessed 1 July 2015.
102. Subedi 2008, supra note 73, 89. For certain differences, see Kaj Hobér and Joshua Fellenbaum, ‘Political
Risk Insurance and Investment Treaty Protection’ in Bungenberg 2015, supra note 68, 1517-1551.
103. Pirker 2013, supra note 14, 347.
104. Ibid. See also Pieter Bekker and Akiko Ogawa, ‘The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Pro-
liferation on Demand for Investment Insurance: Reassessing Political Risk Insurance After the “BIT
Bang”’ (2013) 28 ICSID Review 2, 314-350. Bekker and Ogawa argue that the protection offered by BITs
is substantially similar to that offered by political risk insurance, although they did not find a causal
link between BIT proliferation and demand for political risk insurance.
105. Katselas 2012, supra note 12, 147: ‘the function performed by investment tribunals should not be regar-
ded as equal to the administrative review function, and certainly not to the constitutional-review
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international investment law.106 In the municipal context, deference ensures a legit-
imate allocation of public power among different branches of government. Invest-
ment arbitration, however, does not concern the constitutional legitimacy of
government conduct, but only the host state’s compliance with treaty standards. Con-
sequently, the major justification for deference in the domestic context, the logic of the
separation of powers, does not apply in international investment law. While arbitral
tribunals may issue condemning awards that require the host state to pay compensa-
tion, this does not affect the domestic balance of powers between the different actors
in the constitutional scheme.
. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are few fields of law in which the legitimacy of different forms of dispute res-
olution is as topical as it is in international investment law today.Within this field, the
practice of investor-state arbitration has come under growing criticism for its alleged
infringements on national sovereignty and its prioritisation of private over public
interests. It has been argued that the legitimacy of the current regime could be rein-
forced if tribunals would adopt a deferential approach to the review of contested
domestic measures. Similar approaches have been developed by domestic adminis-
trative and constitutional courts who exercise judicial review.
This chapter has found, however, that the function of investment arbitration is differ-
ent from that of domestic judicial review.Whereas judicial review serves to ensure the
legitimacy of government action within the constitutional framework, investment
arbitration has a more narrow function. Its main purpose is to give investors the
opportunity to obtain indemnification for losses caused by unforeseeable host state
conduct. It is offered in order to sooth investor concerns about regulatory change
and other state measures that would hamper the profitability of the investment. Cer-
tainly, arbitral review of government conduct involves a certain degree of evaluation,
but unlike domestic judicial review, it does not influence the balance of power
between different branches of government, which is where the logic of deference orig-
inates from.
function, performed by national courts. Investment arbitration is an alternative to a host state’s courts
that foreign investors may choose in the event of a dispute with the state, but it is no substitute for
judicial review’. For Katselas, however, the differences between arbitral and judicial review provide
a reason for even greater deference in the context of investment arbitration.
106. James Egerton-Vernon argues that deference actually comprises the legitimacy of investor-state arbi-
tration. Egerton-Vernon 2010, supra note 43, 204: ‘Tribunals must reject the application of inappropri-
ate public law standards of review and instead revert to the strict application of the provisions of the
international treaties governing their disputes. Only through thereby returning investment law to its
private law roots can it perform the function for which it was created’. Egerton-Vernon argues that it
should be left to states to reform the current system as they see fit.
 Evolution in Dispute Resolution
The narrow approach to investor-state arbitration described so far may soothe some
of the concerns raised against it in recent times. In response to the fear that investor-
state arbitration threatens democratic decision-making, it could be emphasised that
the evaluation of state policies undertaken by arbitral tribunals is of a different nature
than the one undertaken by administrative and constitutional courts. Moreover, the
alleged intrusion into sovereignty could be put into perspective by the fact that an
arbitral award does not touch upon the legality of state measures in the domestic legal
order, but only results in the indemnification of the investor.
The argument proposed here is different from the public law approach to interna-
tional investment law. According to the latter perspective, the legitimacy of inves-
tor-state arbitration can be enhanced if arbitral tribunals would act more like
domestic courts involved in the judicial review of state action. It is argued here, how-
ever, that the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration would be better served by a
sharper distinction between the functions of arbitral tribunals on the one hand and
domestic courts on the other hand. Conceiving investor-state arbitration as the inter-
national counterpart of administrative law review may actually threaten the legiti-
macy of the international investment law regime, because it turns arbitral tribunals
into administrators of global governance and, consequently, expands their authority
beyond the settlement of investor claims, which was their original mandate.
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